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I. INTRODUCTION
Less than one year after graduating from Harvard Law School, Gloria
resigned from the legal profession.' The precipitating incident was Gloria's
success in obtaining a crucial admission from a poorly educated woman who
had been permanently disabled in a pressing machine accident. 2 As she de-
scribed the case:
Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Denver.
Chair, Department of Sociology and Professor of Law, Policy and Society Ph.D program,
Northeastern University. Funding for this research was generously provided by the Program on
the Legal Profession at Harvard University Law School and the W. M. Keck Foundation. The
authors would like to acknowledge Deborah Rhode and David Wilkins for their contributions to
this paper.
I Telephone Interview with (Gloria Waters), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Apr. 1993).
All respondent names cited in this article have been changed to conceal their identity. All inter-
views are on file with Robert Granfield.
2 Gloria explained that:
1
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When [the disabled woman] walked into the room, she and I
were the only women in the room. All the other lawyers and
experts were male. She just immediately felt that she and I
were on the same side because we were both women. Well,
[because she didn't understand the situation] she just spilled her
guts. She told me that she and her employer had cooperated to-
gether to disconnect the safety features. You could not make
your quota with the safety system in place. The outcome of the
case was that the woman didn't get anything. The whole thing
made me sick. I felt - and this is not the attitude of a lawyer but
the attitude of a human being - that we should have just given
her the money [that the company paid the law firm] and told her
to go home. It's hard to be a human being and a lawyer!3
Had Gloria failed to convey the woman's confession to her client, the pressing
company, she would have been in violation of the rules of professional respon-
sibility by failing to uphold the principle of zealous advocacy. Gloria's personal
morality, which would have led her to protect the injured woman at her client's
expense, conflicted with the ethical principles of zealous advocacy that she had
learned in law school.
Unlike law school hypotheticals, real world legal cases involve human
pain and suffering. Gloria's deep personal conflict with this case arose because
she perceived its contextual elements: a low-wage, minority woman with a
fourth grade education working in a sweatshop. This was not simply a technical
matter of products liability to Gloria, but was rather a situation that involved
social inequality and power differentials. If the woman had refused to remove
the safety device, she would probably have been fired for being too slow.
Although extreme, Gloria's anguish over being both a good "human be-
ing and a lawyer" is not a rare occurrence.4 Remaining a moral human being
while simultaneously upholding the ethical obligations associated with the legal
[t]he case was brought by an elderly black woman with a fourth grade educa-
tion. She worked in one of those laundries on a "cuff and collar" press. These
machines heat up to 350 degrees. The operators of the machines, many of
who are poor and black, put the wet shirt in the machine, press a button and
the top of the machine lowers and presses it. Then she presses another button
and it releases. Our firm was hired by the manufacturer to show that the
manufacturer had made a safe machine and that it wasn't our client's fault the




4 See Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REv. 871 (1999) (describing the conflict be-
tween professional ethics and personal morality).
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profession produces conflicts that most lawyers experience. This article ad-
dresses how young lawyers negotiate and manage ethical dilemmas and the im-
plications that their adjustments to these troubling situations have for law school
ethics instruction.
Part II begins by reviewing the various critiques of legal ethics educa-
tion in American law schools. While the literature in this field is insightful, it
often lacks an empirical basis. Part III presents interview data that explores the
relationship between ethical instruction in the law school classroom and the
moral conflicts that lawyers experience at the beginning of their legal careers.
Forty young attorneys employed in a variety of settings, including large law
firms, public interest groups, in-house counsels, and government were included
in this study. We explore how these young lawyers reconcile the canons of pro-
fessional responsibility that they learned in law school with their own personal
moral codes. In short, this article examines the ways that young lawyers man-
age their humanity in the face of careers filled with moral dilemmas. In Parts III
and TV, the article concludes with a discussion of how legal ethics education
could benefit from the gathering of additional empirical data on ethical decision-
making. 5
II. THE DEBATE OVER ETHICAL INSTRUCTION IN LAW SCHOOL
Lawyers are frequently criticized for a variety of ethical lapses such as
being greedy, dishonest, overly litigious and more concerned with winning than
promoting justice.6  Some assert that recent trends in legal practice expose
Law school ethics courses are given under a variety of titles. As James Moliterno notes:
Courses taught in the popular, single-semester, free-standing format have pri-
marily been three: "legal ethics" (thought to exclude treatment of some non-
ethics legal topics such as malpractice and thought by some to connote an
sense of moralizing, also referred to regularly as an oxymoron); "legal profes-
sion" (thought to be a dodge of broader ethics issues, limiting talk of ethics to
the grand traditions of the profession and its history); and "professional re-
sponsibility" (connoting to some an excessive reliance on study of the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (1980) or the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct (1989)).
James E. Molitemo, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of
the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 83, 83 n.1 (1991).
Traditional approaches to teaching legal ethics pay attention to such issues as rules govern-
ing conflict of interest, the lawyer's obligation to uphold confidentiality, the pros and cons of
zealous advocacy, and the attorney-client privilege. There are several limitations to simply teach-
ing the rules of professional responsibility. Such approaches do not generally explore the day-to-
day conduct and issues of management across the range of professional organizations including
large law firms, government practices, sole practitioners, in-house counsel, etc.. Such approaches
are generally at odds with the reality of modem law practice. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss,
Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, A Case Study, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 817 (2000) (citing
traditional approaches to teaching legal ethics).
6 W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American Lawyers: Perception, Real-
20031
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young attorneys to increasingly complex ethical dilemmas that need to be coun-
tered through more effective ethical training.7 The American Bar Association's
Report on the Commission on Professionalism, for example, has argued that the
bar's growing commercialism tempts lawyers to put profit before ethical princi-
ples, undermines professional controls, and reduces the identification of young
attorneys with established ethical norms.8 The Commission accused lawyers of
becoming subservient to business interests and of pursuing profit at the expense
of the traditional ideals of independence and public spiritedness.9 The bar was
urged to enact reforms that would lead attorneys to aspire toward the pursuit of
professional community and public service rather than material gain.1° Enron
and other recent scandals are focusing additional attention on the question of
whether corporate lawyers have sufficient independence and ethical grounding
to protect the public interest against corrupt business executives."'
Several scholars argue that law schools must assume the burden of eth-
ics education because today's large bureaucratic law firms do not provide the
close working relationship with mentors and other colleagues that had formerly
allowed young lawyers to observe ethical decision-making first-hand.12 With
the breakdown of the strong nexus between lawyers and the local communities
they serve, the traditional ethical norms and obligations binding lawyers to the
public interest are said to have weakened. Mary Ann Glendon observes that:
today's lawyers wander in an increasingly impersonal, bureauc-
ratized legal world, where neither honesty-based nor loyalty-
ity, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L. REv. 527, 528 (2002) (reporting that
"[s]urvey after survey of public opinion shows lawyers gradually slipping below politicians and
journalists, and even approaching car salesmen and advertising executive levels in the public's
esteem").
7 See Subha Dhanaraj, Comment, Making Lawyers Good People: Possibility or Pipe Dream?,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2037, 2068 (2001) (noting that neither professional ethics codes nor legal
education promote moral growth in law students).
8 See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION (2000) (discussing ABA report and other criticisms of legal ethics).
9 Id. at 14.
10 See generally Sol M. Linowitz, Regaining Respect for the Legal Profession: Some Sugges-
tions, 60 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8 (1988) (proposing reforms to raise attorneys' image in the public's per-
ception).
I See Patti Waldmeir, A Failure to Squeal: Lawyers Do Not Have to Police Their Clients But
the Enron Affair Shows That They May Have Forgotten a Subtler Public Duty, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2002, at 11 (asking whether "competition [has] eroded ethical standards beyond the power
of the ABA to repair").
12 For an in-depth empirical study of lawyers in large corporate law firms, see ROBERT
NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM
(1988). See also Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profession,
68 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 85 (1994).
[Vol. 105
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based systems seem to be operating. The families, communi-
ties, neighborhoods, and schools that once served as seedbeds
and anchors for personal and professional virtues are them-
selves in considerable disarray .... New recruits to today's [le-
gal] profession often have no solid base of old world, old Wasp,
or any other culture to fall back on - and no coherent profes-
sional culture to embrace.
1 3
This alleged deterioration of the spirit of professionalism has led to calls for a
re-professionalization in order to reclaim the lost gemeinschaft14 of the golden
age of the legal community. 5
Law schools are often criticized for failing to put sufficient effort into
integrating ethical lessons into the overall curriculum.' 6 Critics charge that law
13 MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFES-
SION Is TRANSFORMING THE AMERICAN SOCIETY 83 (1994)
14 The concept of gemeinschaft was first articulated by the German sociologist Ferdinand
Tonnies who set out to chronicle the social characteristics of industrial society. FERDINAND
TONNIES, GEMEINSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT [COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY] (1963; orig. 1887).
Tonnies used the term gemeinschaft to refer to a type of social organization in which people are
bound closely together by kinship and tradition. His formulation is similar to the concept of me-
chanical solidarity that was developed by French sociologist Emile Durkheim who proposed indi-
viduals living in small societies without a complex division of labor tended to a develop strong
social bonds with each other. EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893) (ar-
guing that social bonds were the basis of the solidarity of traditionally based societies); see also
JOHN MACIONIS, SOCIOLOGY (1996) (discussing the parallels between the concepts of Tonnies and
Durkheim).
15 For a general discussion of the perceived loss of community in the contemporary legal
profession, see Eliot Freidson, Professionalism Reborn, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS'
PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATION IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 215 (Robert L. Nelson et al.
eds., 1992) [hereinafter LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES] (calling for a renewal of profes-
sionalism within the bar); Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Profes-
sionalism, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 230 (investigating rea-
sons for taking the professional ideal seriously). The notion that there was once a golden age of
ethical lawyering, however, may be illusionary. The ethical standards of attorneys have been
criticized throughout American history.
Lawyers helped deliver the nation, but hostility to them was deep-rooted.
They were pettifoggers who'd argue any case regardless of its merits. By the
1830's, lawyers gave order to the country - as local leaders, as interpreters of
the Constitution - but with a system of justice that was said to betray morality
because of its reliance on technicalities. In 1870 the New York City bar was
set up to reform the practices of lawyers and restore their honor after a run of
scandals. Lawyers of that era bribed legislators, manipulated judges and im-
periled the law's legitimacy. In this century, Prohibition-era lawyers were
blamed for bootlegging. Depression-era lawyers were accused of abandoning
all but the wealthy. After World War II, the American Bar Association was
chastised for leading the witch-hunts against Communists.
See L. Caplin, Who Ya Gonna Call? 1-800-sueme, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 20, 1996, at 36.
16 See Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching egal Ethics, 39 WM. &
2003]
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school ethical training is undermined by isolating the moral message into a sin-
gle, devalued course. 17 Surveys have shown that students regard ethics courses
as inferior to those that teach legal skills.18 Ronald Pipkin found that students
perceive "legal ethics courses as requiring less time, as substantially easier, as
less well taught and as a less valuable use of class time than their other course
work." 19
In her survey of casebooks outside of the field of professional responsi-
bility conducted nearly a decade ago, Deborah Rhode found that only 1.4 per-
cent of total pages were devoted to the subject of ethics.2° She has now updated
this statistic in her most recent survey, finding that while there is movement in
the right direction, still only 2.5 percent of total pages deal with professional
responsibility issues, attesting to the fact that "legal ethics in the core curriculum
tends to be superficial or ad hoc .... Many of these references involved sim-
ply reprinting the relevant rules, rather than any exploration of moral issues.
Colin Croft similarly complains that:
By "fencing off' [law school ethical] discourse with a limited
credit, delayed enrollment course, providing precious little time
for extending discussions beyond the uninspiring rules of the
Model Code and Model Rules, legal education effectively insu-
lates discussions of legal professional standards from the rest of
the law school curriculum.
22
MARY L. REV. 409, 409 (1998) (suggesting that the existence of more than thirty guides for the
teaching of professional responsibility indicates dissatisfaction of way the course is currently
taught).
17 See Deborah L. Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 732-735
(1994) [hereinafter Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics] (critiquing legal ethics for being "ghettoized"
into one professional responsibility course); see also James R. Elkins, Ethics: Professionalism,
Craft and Failure, 73 KENT. L. J. 937, 965 (1984) [hereinafter Elkins, Professionalism, Craft and
Failure] (supporting the teaching of an "ethic of craftsmanship" over an arrogant "ethics of pro-
fessionalism"); Paul Lowell Haines, Note, Restraining the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for
Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445, 458 (1990) (calling for modifying the "system radically by
either abandoning zealous advocacy or seriously modifying its structure; [reforming] the rules
modestly to further clarify the lawyer's responsibility; . . . or better educate lawyers about the
current rules and their responsibilities under those rules .. ") (footnotes omitted).
18 Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 40-42 (1992)
[hereinafter Rhode, Pervasive Method].
W9 Ronald Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility: A Circular Paradox,
2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247, 258 (1979).
20 Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 18, at 41.
21 Deborah Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professors, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 158,
165 (2001).
22 Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism: A Proposal for Delibera-
tive Moral Community, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1256, 1339 n.482 (1992) (citing Walter H. Bennett, Jr.,
[Vol. 105
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Other critics charge that law schools fail to successfully teach ethical
behavior because they have a hidden curriculum that replaces the cultivation of
"practical wisdom" with an amoral emphasis on winning at all costs. 23  Law
school teaches students to become tough-minded, hyper-rational, and insensitive
to issues beyond the interests of their client - a perspective that undermines
ethical decision-making. Judge Harry Edwards charges that, "while the schools
are moving toward pure theory, the firms are moving towards pure commerce,
and the middle ground - ethical practice - has been deserted by both., 24 He
calls for the integration of professional values and practical skills in legal educa-
tion.
An overly formalistic approach to teaching professional responsibility
can actually undermine the student's ethical impulses and broader concerns for
25social justice. If the focus of legal analysis is on abstract jurisprudential prin-
ciples, largely ignoring the social context, the code of ethics may be viewed as
an unrealistic set of ideals rather than a guide to real world behavior.26 As Paul
Haines notes, "The proliferation of rules decreases moral sensitivity and devel-
opment, reduces flexibility, and discourages critical thinking. In effect, the law-
yer enters a 'simplified moral world' and becomes an 'unreflective rule fol-
lower.'
27
Critical theorists maintain that the rules of professional conduct will not
restore morality to the legal profession because the code itself is largely a self-
Making Moral Lawyers: A Modest Proposal, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 45, 51 (1986)).
23 Perhaps of the most turgid critiques of the failure of law schools to educate graduates to
deal with complex legal realities is ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 165-70 (1993) (citing the "decline" of law school instruction for failing
to promote the character traits of deliberative wisdom and public-spiritedness that is associated
with the "lawyer-statesman"). See also Sharon Dolovich, Ethical Lawyering and the Possibility of
Integrity, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1651 n.85 (2002) (citing the need for legal education to
encourage integrity among law students).
24 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Pro-
fession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992) (discussing the tensions between the duty of zealous
advocacy and maintaining integrity).
25 See Deborah L. Rhode, Professionalism in Professional Schools, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
193 (1999) [hereinafter Rhode, Professionalism] (arguing that too often legal coursework seems
largely a matter of technical craft, divorced from the broader concerns of social justice that led
many students to law schools).
26 For discussions of decontextualization in legal education, see ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING
ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND BEYOND (1992) [hereinafter GRANFIELD,
MAKING ELITE LAWYERS] (arguing that law students experience a transformation of ideals in law
school); Robert Granfield, Lawyers and Power: Reproduction and Resistance in the Legal Profes-
sion, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 205 (1996) (reviewing several empirical studies of the legal profes-
sion); Robert Granfield, Constructing Professional Boundaries in Law School: Reactions of Stu-
dents and Implications for Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STuD. 53 (1994) (examining
the decontextualized pedagogy within law school).
27 Haines, supra note 17, at 46.
20031
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interested smoke screen designed to legitimize the legal profession's relative
freedom from outside control.z8 For example, Criton Constantinides argues that:
[e]thics codes are excellent public relations tools which the pro-
fessional group can point to when supporting its status, auton-
omy and practices.... [A] professional ethics code that outlines
the profession's obligations to the public represents a vital com-
ponent in an exchange between the professional group and soci-
ety. The group promises to monitor the profession to insure a
high standard of service and protect the public in exchange for
the right to be free from external intervention.29
Ethical codes are frequently invoked by professional groups to extend
and defend their status when the profession's prestige is uncertain or under at-
tack.30 As in medicine, the legal profession's increasing concern with the ethi-
cal practices of lawyers has been attributed to the law's waning cultural author-
ity in society. 3' In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the American Bar Asso-
ciation ("ABA") made ethical instruction mandatory for law school accredita-
tion.32 As Phillip Kissam notes:
The special problem with the lawyers in and out of the Nixon
Administration who participated in Watergate was their appar-
ent inability to distinguish between private interests and the
public interest, that is, to perceive the public morality or legality
28 The conflict perspective of the sociology of professions argues that professions engage in a
collective struggle to gain and extend market control of the services they deliver. Professions
represent collective mobility projects that seek to establish monopolies through processes of social
closure that are designed to restrict access of low status groups to the profession. See generally
MAGALI SARFATH LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977) (arguing that professions are
self-interested groups seeking to enhance their collective status); CHARLES DERBER ET AL., POWER
IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE (1992) (arguing that professions constitute a new elite within advanced
society). For a discussion of professional power as it pertains to the legal profession, see
RICHARD ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989) (examining the power of the legal profession to
establish monopoly control over the services it provides).
29 Criton A. Constantinides, Note, Professional Ethics Codes in Court: Redefining the Social
Contract Between the Public and the Professions, 25 GA. L. REV. 1327, 1340 (1991).
30 See Andrew Abbott, Professional Ethics, 88 AM. J. Soc. 855 (1982) (arguing that ethical
codes are used to raise the prestige of a profession).
31 See ROBERT ZUSSMAN, INTENSIVE CARE: MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
(1992) (describing the ethical challenges faced by medical professionals). For a similar discussion
of the ethical crisis in law, see generally GLENDON, supra note 13.
32 See generally Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEx. L.
REV. 639 (1981) (discussing the history of ethics instruction in legal education).
[Vol. 105
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that lawyers are thought to serve as interpreters (and enforcers)
of the law.33
To remedy this perceived crisis in ethical standards within the legal profession,
instruction in "the history, goals, structure, and responsibilities of the legal pro-
fession and its members, including the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity" was deemed necessary. 4 As public anger over the misdeeds of accountants
and bankers in Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia and other major bankruptcies turns
to the role played by corporate lawyers in these debacles, demands for strength-
ened training in legal ethics are almost inevitable.
35
The codes of professional conduct has been criticized for absolving
lawyers for "morally indefensible" activities when they are performed in the
interests of their clients. David Luban, for example, observes that the standard
conception of "non-accountability" within the Model Rules of Professional Re-
sponsibility undermines social justice by encouraging lawyers to be zealous ad-
vocates for clients with immoral, but not illegal, interests. 36 This "higher im-
morality" is mandated by the canons of professional responsibility.37 From this
perspective, the seeds of the problem lie in the biases of the code itself, in con-
trast to the traditional viewpoint that argues for closer adherence to the rules of
professional responsibility.
33 Philip C. Kissam, The Decline of Law School Professionalism, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 251, 283
(1986) (discussing the abandonment of ethical values in law school).
34 Molitemo, supra note 5, at 87 n.24. Some have argued that requiring these courses has not
accomplished much to improve the profession. As James Elkins states:
We have mandated the teaching of legal ethics and made it another subject in
the law school curriculum. But in doing so, we still do not adequately explore
what ethics means to lawyers, how ethics works in the day-to-day life of par-
ticular lawyers, or what obstacles we confront in our efforts to make ethics a
central concern in legal education. The unexamined premise, now widely ac-
cepted, is that legal ethics is a subject to be taught and learned by those who
set out to be lawyers. We hold, at the same time, quite stubbornly, the intui-
tive notion that students have already acquired their moral and ethical sensi-
bilities before they arrive at the law school. Consequently, we teach ethics,
denying that ethics can be taught.
James R. Elkins, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 117, 196 (2000) [hereinafter Elkins, Lawyer Ethics].
35 See Vanessa Blackburn, After Enron, Ethics Now at the Forefront, BELLINGHAM Bus. J.,
May 1, 2002 at B6 (suggesting that "some serious ethical questions about the behavior of the
lawyers and accountants" are being raised).
36 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 148-74 (1988) (suggesting that
the ideological principle of "non-accountability" in which lawyers are not the conscience of the
clients they serve, protects the legal profession from moral culpability).
37 C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 343-61 (1956) (defining the "higher immorality" to be
the actions of the "power elite" when they use political, economic and ideological power to place
their self-interested activities above the law).
2003]
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If, as these scholars suggest, the ethical code is a mask to disguise the
self-interested activities of legal professionals, then calls for increased profes-
sionalism and ethics instruction may not improve behavior. As James Elkins
writes:
In the ideology of professionalism, more is better. If the profes-
sion is in trouble because individual lawyers provide inadequate
services, misrepresent the clients, or abuse their responsibility
through incompetence and negligence, then the cure is greater
professionalism. If the profession is in trouble because it pro-
motes the interest of the individual, pays too little attention to
the community and society, and ignores the harm that individu-
als are willing to perpetrate in pursuit of their own self-interest,
then the cure is greater professionalism.
38
The recent string of corporate bankruptcies has led to increased criti-
cism of the ABA's ethical code:
[Q]uestions about the performance of Enron's attorneys leading
up to the firm's collapse are prompting new calls for lawyers to
blow the whistle on a client before financial harm is done to
others-in much the same way lawyers are expected to speak
up to prevent bodily injury or death.39
III. THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
The foregoing review of the literature suggests that the field of legal
ethics is in a state of turmoil and that solutions to this problem are the subject of
intense debate. Unfortunately, most critiques of legal ethics and legal ethics
education are based on the author's personal insights and observations rather
than on systematic empirical research that focuses on how attorneys experience
ethical issues within the context of their practice.4° Designing effective profes-
sional responsibility instruction is extremely difficult since rules regarding ethi-
38 Elkins, Lawyer Ethics, supra note 34, at 939.
39 Lisa Girion, Calls for Lawyers to Blow the Whistle, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2002, Part 3, at 1
(discussing attempts by lawyers to convince the American Bar Association to alter the ethical
code by requiring attorneys to protect the public from financial misdeeds of their clients); see also
Wilson Chu & Barrett R. Howell, Deal-Maker or Deal-Killer?: Ethical Dilemmas ... and More,
6 THE M&A LAWYER 10, 12 (2002) ( "Model Rule 1.6 provides that lawyers are prohibited from
revealing confidential client information to outsiders except when we reasonably believe that
disclosure of the information is necessary to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm.").
40 For a notable exception to this, which presents empirical data on gender differences in ethi-
cal reasoning among lawyers, see RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF MEN AND WOMEN LAWYERS (1989).
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cal behavior do not always provide sufficient guidance. Codes of ethics have
typically ignored the social context in which professional decisions are made.4'
Professionals are often situated in complex, real world occupational
contexts that remain messy despite the rule systems designed to eliminate ambi-
guity. 42 Variations in the institutional contexts of the workplace produce pro-
found effects on professional lives. 43 "One size fits all" regulations may not be
of much use to lawyers working in different organizational contexts, serving
different types of clients, and attempting to accomplish different ends. Thus,
attention to the context of work is important in understanding and teaching the
principles of ethical decision-making by professionals.
In most cases, empirical research examining the effectiveness of legal
ethics instruction has been restricted to paper and pencil assessments of changed
values or studying whether graduates of ethics classes respond more "ethically"
to a classroom exercise.4a In contrast, we will examine the complex interactions
between the ethical lessons learned at law school (both in and out of the class-
room) and the real world ethical dilemmas they face in practice as young attor-
neys through in-depth interviews. This part examines the ways in which young
lawyers in a variety of organizational settings construct and resolve their ethical
dilemmas.
Our study is designed to inform the continuing debate among teachers
of professional responsibility courses regarding ways to prepare students for the
ethical issues that they will confront as practitioners. These discussions, and the
curriculum changes they have fostered, offer promising new ways of exploring
questions of ethics, values and professional responsibility in the classroom.45
Better pedagogical methods can be developed with a more sophisticated under-
standing of how workplace experiences shape professional behavior. In the
words of Eleanor Myers:
41 See generally Jane B. Baron & Richard K. Greenstein, Constructing the Field of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 37 (2001) (arguing that neither
the rules governing lawyers' behavior nor philosophical ethics should be studied in isolation).
42 See ZYGMUNT BAUMAN, POSTMODERN ETHICS (1993) (discussing the difficulties of estab-
lishing ethical standards in the post-modem world).
43 See ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL POWERS (1986) (discussing the importance of analyz-
ing professions from a sociological perspective).
44 Many studies of ethics in law and legal education have been conducted through the use of
quantitative analysis, typically employing statistical modeling of responses on surveys given to a
large sample. See Pipkin, supra note 19 (employing empirical research to argue that instruction in
professional responsibility fails needs improvement); see also Jerome E. Carlin, What Law
Schools Can Do About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. L. REV. 459 (1971); Harry W. Jones,
Lawyers and Justice: The Uneasy Ethics of Partisanship, 23 VILL. L. REV. 957 (1978).
45 See generally American Association of Law Schools Symposium: Bringing Values and Per-
spectives Back into the Law School Classroom: Practical Ideas for Teachers, 4 S. CAL. REV. OF
LAW & WOMEN'S STUD. 1 (1994) (discussing various perspectives on the place of values in legal
education); see also Bryant Garth & Joanne Martin, Law Schools and the Construction of Compe-
tence, 43 J. LEGAL ED. 469 (1993).
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If our educational efforts are to make a contribution to the re-
vival of professionalism, our teaching should be informed by an
appreciation for the dominant role that the culture and values of
the workplace have on the way that lawyers behave profession-
ally.46
Our concern here is to explore the context of professional practice in order to
provide insight into the complex issues surrounding ethical behavior and deci-
sion-making in legal practice.47
A. Methods
Recent socio-legal scholarship has emphasized the importance of study-
ing the relationship between ideology and behavior in legal settings through
48narratives. In the words of Robert Nelson and David Trubek:
This trend within legal studies is properly seen as part of a lar-
ger movement within the social sciences and the humanities to
analyze how individual and institutional actors construct sys-
tems of meaning that take on the appearance of external reality.
49
As Patricia Ewick and Susan Silbey note, "Narratives are likely to bear the
marks of existing social inequities, disparities of power, and ideological ef-
fects., 50 The visions of practice lawyers develop and construct within their oc-
cupational contexts have critical consequences for practitioners as well as the
clients they serve. 5'
46 Eleanor Myers, "Simple Truths" About Moral Education, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 823, 824-25
(1996) (discussing the importance for understanding the impact of the workplace on lawyer be-
havior).
47 Cf. David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice is the Troubling Case, in CONFRONTING CONTEXT
IN LEGAL ETHIcs IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE AND TROUBLE CASES (Austin Sarat et al eds. 1998) (call-
ing for a sociological exploration into the impact of institutional context on legal practice and
ethics).
48 The collection of narratives, or life stories, has a long tradition in socio-legal studies. See
generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to
Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000) (discussing the use of narratives in law
school courses); David M. Engel, Origin Myths: Narratives of Authority, Resistance, Disability,
and Law, 27 L. AND SOC'Y REV. 785 (1993) (discussing the power of narratives in understanding
parental resistance to disabled classifications of their children).
49 LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 4.
50 Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey, Subversive Stories and Hegemonic Tales: Toward a
Sociology of Narrative, 29 L. AND Soc'Y REV. 197, 222 (1995) (analyzing variations in legal
consciousness).
51 See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS
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Data for this paper was collected as part of a longitudinal study of the
professional lives of elite lawyers.52 Forty Harvard Law School graduates who
had taken part in an earlier study of law school socialization were selected for
in-depth interviews.53 Cases were chosen through a stratified sub-sample drawn
from the original sample of 103 graduates in order to ensure representation in a
wide variety of professional settings.54 After respondents had been identified
and located, extensive telephone interviews were conducted to determine
whether the ethical guidance that respondents received in law school had proven
valuable to them after several years of practice and to examine what moral con-
flicts, if any, they are experiencing in their legal careers. While this sample is
limited in that it includes only graduates of this elite law school, it nonetheless
offers insight into the larger issue of ethics in practice. Because there is a pau-
city of data on this subject, any information on the ethical experiences of law-
yers is useful.56
The sample possesses gender and racial diversity. Almost one-half of
the forty interviewees are women and nearly one-quarter are minorities. At the
time of the interviews, the average length of time since these lawyers graduated
(1988) (discussing how lawyers' vision of law and practice constructs clients); AUSTIN SARAT &
WILLIAM L. F. FESTINGER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN
LEGAL PROCESS (1995) (discussing a qualitative study of lawyer-client interactions).
52 See generally GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS, supra note 26 (describing an empirical
study of law students).
53 These graduates were located through the assistance of the alumni office at Harvard Law
School.
54 The original study of law school socialization was conducted by the lead author in the late
1980s. Most of those participating in this follow-up study graduated from law school during that
period. The research was predominantly an ethnographic examination of the experiences students
have in law school, as well as an analysis of their occupational decisions. For that study, anony-
mous surveys were also used to collect quantitative data. The 103 original in-depth interviews,
along with extensive field notes from observation and less structured interviews, were conducted
with students during their law school years. These students were selected on the basis to which
they represented distinct student orientations and perspectives, particularly with regards to their
future occupational positions within the legal profession. The subjects that were selected for this
study were chosen to represent different workplace settings. First, subjects were stratified by
occupational setting including large law firms, public interest practice, government, and other sites
of legal work. Subjects were then randomly selected from each category.
55 There have been significant changes in the teaching of legal ethics at Harvard Law School
and elsewhere since these lawyers graduated in the late 1980s. Many ethics courses now include
context-based content. However, there continues to be a paucity of classroom material that is
drawn from empirical experiences. Only a few casebooks currently include context-based con-
tent. See generally Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 18. We hope that our investigation will
contribute to the efforts of legal ethics teachers in their ongoing curricular reforms and improve-
ments.
56 Extensive theoretical and experiential literature discusses the ethical problems faced by
attorneys but there is very little empirical research on the actual ethical dilemmas encountered by
young lawyers and how these problems are resolved.
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from law school was four years. No respondent refused to be interviewed, and
many expressed considerable interest in the results since they had previously
participated in the law school study. In-depth, tape-recorded interviews lasting
approximately two hours were conducted with all forty respondents, demonstrat-
ing their willingness to explore complex issues. Questions focused on the re-
spondent's career path, work-related pressures, experiences with discrimination,
the extent of respondent's preparation for legal work, and ethical dilemmas. A
semi-structured format was used in order to elicit open-ended narratives.
B. Relevance of Ethical Instruction in Professional Practice
Respondents in this study almost uniformly felt that their ethics training
in law school had done little to prepare them for the issues they now confront as
practicing attorneys. Only three of the forty respondents characterized their
ethics course as valuable preparation for their legal careers. The vast majority
reported that their ethics course had merely provided them with formalistic in-
struction about the rules of professional responsibility, not with the tools neces-
sary to resolve moral dilemmas. As one large law firm attorney explained:
I don't think ethics classes did much at all. My ethics class was
really a study of the model rules and the model codes. It was
about conflicts of interest and that kind of thing but it didn't
teach you at all about the kinds of issues that really come up ...
. I don't think it really trains you to know what to do or to feel
strongly one way or the other.57
For many, the focus on formal ethics rules was insufficient since it typi-
cally severed cases from the social, political, and organizational contexts in
which they are embedded. It was ethical issues ignored by the code of profes-
sional conduct that these young attorneys found most troubling. One attorney,
who worked for a prestigious Washington-based law firm, explained the short-
comings of his professional responsibility course:
As the profession defines ethical problems, there's no ethical
problem with representing the tobacco institute (which I regu-
larly did). The kind of slimy ethics thing that I didn't run into is
what they talk about in law school. 8
This young attorney was strongly opposed to defending cigarette manufacturers.
He solved his moral quandary by arranging a transfer to a division that he found
less ethically questionable. He explained, "It took me about 8 months to work
57 Telephone Interview with (Ron Gant), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Mar. 1993).
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my way out of this assignment. The way I did it was by playing squash with
this one partner and telling him I was interested in [his area of practice]. I saw
[that] as a way out."'59 However, until the respondent was permanently reas-
signed to this partner, he continued his tobacco work, forcing him to bear con-
siderable personal discomfort. This respondent described himself as a "water-
walker" in the firm, and credited his popularity with allowing him to negotiate
his way into a different area of practice.
Similarly, another attorney reported that she was not prepared for the
social and political realities of institutional practice in a leading New York law
firm. She had not realized "the amount of commitment that I was expected to
give to my clients," even the ones that she had moral doubts about such as the
"large industrial cases, like tobacco litigation. ' 6° The young attorney com-
plained of being disenchanted and "questioned the meaningfulness of all this."'
'
She felt that law school should have provided her with a better understanding of
the social environment of elite legal practice:
[Legal ethics courses] should cover stuff like the glass ceiling,
bureaucracy and hierarchy in the law firm. I think students
really need to be given the opportunity to discuss practice issues
and [courses should] bring in people to present these issues. I
remember when I was in law school I didn't know anything
about being a lawyer or about real ethical issues that come up.
62
This finding echoes David Wilkins' charge that:
The traditional model [of teaching legal ethics] pays relatively
scant attention to distinctions in the tasks lawyers perform (i.e.,
litigation versus ex ante counseling), the subject areas in which
they practice (i.e., criminal versus civil), the clients they repre-
sent (i.e., individuals versus corporations), or the setting in
which they work (solo practice versus firms or other institu-
tions) .63
While there are curriculum efforts being conducted to overcome these
problems, traditional professional responsibility courses generally have not pre-
pared students for the kinds of institutionalized injustices and pressures these
respondents face because, as Moliterno points out:
59 Id.
60 Telephone Interview with (Lisa Lyman), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Apr. 1993).
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Wilkins, supra note 47, at 71-72.
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[t]he lawyer's life is not a series of dilemmas that present them-
selves by way of short vignettes. Presenting the ethics course as
such a series of problems misleads the student into thinking that
ethics are a set of rules for resolving a finite list of the problems
that lawyers face. 64
In the absence of these real world contexts, ethics cases presented to students in
law school are frequently too nebulous to provide much guidance.
Large law firms were not the only work setting to produce ethical trou-
ble spots. Respondents working as public defenders reported that, although the
rules of professional responsibility are theoretically universal, the code actually
offers little guidance in resolving the unique problems they confronted.65 One
legal services attorney complained that neither the ethical code nor her law
school training assisted her in dealing with moral quandaries such as "how to
treat clients" or determining if a client is "competent to form an attorney-client
relationship. 66 She was troubled by the question of whether a defense attorney
has any responsibility to protect the community against violent offenders or to
intervene in the lives of clients. For example, when defending a drug dealer
who was being evicted from his apartment, this lawyer faced a moral issue that
had not been explored during her legal education:
64 Moliterno, supra note 5, at 107-08.
65 Theodore Schneyer argues that differences in ethical views regarding practices such as pro
bono can be traced to the structural differences in the workplace, clientele, and the political envi-
ronment. For example, contingency fees, advertising, and class action litigation are frequently
denounced as unethical by the defense bar but seen as vital by plaintiffs attorneys. See generally
Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of the Modem Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES, supra note 15, at 95. Plaintiff's
lawyers, in contrast, attack the morality of opposing counsel by accusing them of being "corporate
ambulance chasers" and of using their greater resources to stymie deserving plaintiffs. Defense
lawyers stand accused of "poisoning the jury well" by orchestrating campaigns to convince the
public that there is a litigation crisis which damages American competitiveness. See Ross E.
Cheit, Corporate Ambulance Chasers: The Charmed Life of Business Litigation, 11 STUD. L. POL. &
Soc'Y 119 (1991). Fordham Law School has attempted to deal with differentiated ethical issues
faced by different parts of the bar by offering four different professionalism courses: Professional
Responsibility; Ethics in Public Interest Law; Professional Responsibility in Corporate, Business,
and International Transactions; and Ethics in Criminal Advocacy. See James L. Oakes, Commen-
tary on Judge Edwards' "Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession",
91 MICH. L. REv. 2163 (1993). This is consistent with-Wilkins, who argues:
the divergent realities of practicing lawyers preclude the formation of [a uni-
fied normative] culture ... [l]awyers who represent large corporations are dif-
ferent from those who represent individuals. Plaintiffs' lawyers are different
from defendants' lawyers. Lawyers in large cities are different from lawyers
in small towns. Lawyers who litigate are different from lawyers who primar-
ily negotiate or provide office counseling.
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARv. L. REV. 468, 487-88 (1990).
66 Telephone Interview with (Rebecca Stout), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Apr. 1993).
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No one in the community wants this person in the apartment
anymore. It gets pretty heated because you get feedback from
the community, and I often agree with them. People who sell
drugs are bad for a community. No one tells you in the ethics
class what to do in such cases. What is your duty to the client
as it relates to the community? The model is totally based on
the lawyer and the client, and you put the client first. There's
not a lot of room in the Model Code for the person who's also
thinking about the community.
67
While the traditional ethical approach to such cases emphasizes that
"[n]eutrality requires a lawyer to practice without regard to her personal views
concerning either a client's character or the moral status of his objectives, 68 this
respondent was disturbed by the lack of concern for the community.69 She
found little in the code of professional responsibility that would encourage her
to consider a "host of factors other than the client's own narrow self-interest...
,,70
Another legal services respondent raised similar issues:
The kinds of ethical problems that come up for me are questions
about how to treat clients or problems with opposing counsel.
Like how invasive do you get in a client's life to find out what's
going on, how much you help them solve only the problems
they bring to you and how much you have an obligation to get
into their face and identify a problem they don't want to admit
to. This could be everything from a woman being battered to
the person being an alcoholic. Courses on ethics are pretty si-
71lent on these things.
She concluded her comments by recommending to "never become a public in-
terest lawyer [because], you don't sleep well!" This respondent's observations
speak directly to the point made by legal ethicist Bruce Green, who noted that
"ethical codes give no guidance as to whether the duty of 'zealous representa-
tion' requires an attorney to engage in conduct approaching the line of criminal-
67 Id.
68 Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L.
REv. 1529, 1534.
69 See GLENDON, supra note 13 (arguing that lawyers no longer participate in a common pro-
fessional community).
70 Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,
69 S. CAL. L. REv. 885, 887 (1996) (discussing the characteristics of virtuous lawyers).
71 Telephone Interview with (Cynthia Post), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Apr. 1993).
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ity, whether an attorney must refrain from such conduct, or whether an attorney
has discretion to choose his course of conduct.,
72
In general, respondents reported that their legal ethics courses failed to
provide relevant information to assist them in understanding the social context
that produces ethical dilemmas. Likewise, respondents found that ethics courses
lacked both adequate guidance about the social impact of legal activities and
useful advice for evaluating their obligations to clients and non-clients. Thus, it
is hardly surprising that when asked how they resolve ethical dilemmas, almost
all respondents reported that they "mostly fly by the seat of [their] pants. 73
C. Managing Ethical Uncertainty
Attorneys, as professionals, are granted freedom from being judged by
the normative standards of common morality that is applied to the general pub-
lic. 74 Dilemmas often arise when the ethical code of their profession clashes
with the moral principles that the individual, as a private citizen, may endorse.
A narrow focus on the ethical rules can be used to keep from having to face the
larger moral questions implicit within an act.75 Many of our respondents re-
ported obeying the professional code of legal ethics even if it meant violating
their personal moral codes. The ethical qualms that respondents experienced
were commonly viewed as symptoms of a personal weakness that should not be
allowed to interfere with their professional duties.
Several respondents denied experiencing ethical difficulties, even
though they had been involved in situations that "bothered them personally., 76
For example, one respondent explained that although she had not experienced
any ethical problems, it made her "feel bad at times" that she was taking away
health care benefits from workers or "throwing them out of work., 7 7 The point
made by this respondent echoes Fred Zacharias, who complains that:
72 Bruce A. Green, Zealous Representation Bound: The Intersection of the Ethical Codes and
the Criminal Law, 69 N. C. L. REV. 687, 689 (1991).
73 Telephone Interview with (Mitch Friendly) Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Mar. 1993).
74 See LUBAN, supra note 36 (examining the traditional role morality of lawyers).
75 See Jonathan M. Freiman, Steps Toward a Pedagogy of Improvisation in Legal Ethics, 31 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 1279, 1285-86 (1998) (arguing that current ethics teaching methods in law
school causes the student to manipulate "the ethical code as she would manipulate the law; she
does not ruminate on it as she would ruminate on a moral decision"); see also Steven Hartwell,
Promoting Moral Development Through Experiential Teaching, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995)
(maintaining that experiential education has greater impact than teaching abstract principles).
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the codes do not tell lawyers how to reconcile conflicts between
their personal sense of ethics and the rules.... They do not es-
tablish that moral individuals should be willing to participate in
the role-differentiated system. Nor do the codes speak to the is-
sue of how participating lawyers should act, as moral individu-
als, when they believe the system is flawed.78
The role morality espoused by the code of professional ethics desensi-
tizes many young lawyers to the moral dilemmas posed by the contradictions
they experience. 79 As Joseph Allegretti observes, "[T]he standard complaint
about lawyers is that they are too disposed to substitute role morality for ordi-
nary morality. They do things that ordinary morality condemns, yet defend their
actions on the grounds that their role as a zealous advocate justifies or even de-
mands such actions." 80 By focusing on the technical correctness of their work,
such attorneys overcome their moral doubts. They hold to the letter of the code,
believing that technical compliance absolves them of any blame. 81 Moral ambi-
guity is dealt with by substituting rules of professional ethics for personal codes
of morality. William Sullivan refers to this as a conflict between the ethics of
rules and the ethics of character.82
78 Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and
the Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 228 (1993) (discussing the
use of "role morality" to deal with moral qualms).
79 See Robert Granfield & Thomas Koenig, The Fate of Elite Idealism: Accommodation and
Ideological Work at Harvard Law School, 39 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 315 (1992) (documenting the
undermining of idealism by legal education); CHARLES DERBER, PROFESSIONALS AS WORKERS:
MENTAL LABOR IN ADVANCED CAPITALISM (1982) (discussing ideological neutralization among
professionals); ROBERT JACKELL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988)
(examining the organizational basis for ethical conflicts within corporate culture).
so Joseph Allegretti, Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: An Essay on George Orwell and the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 16 (1993). The concept of role morality, as
distinct from a common morality, suggests that professionals engage in practices that are consid-
ered legitimate because of the expressed virtues of the occupational role. For instance, the stan-
dard deontological assumption within the legal profession is that lawyers have a duty or obligation
to be a zealous advocate for their client. Even when acting in the interests of a client, the lawyer,
in the occupational role as lawyer, is not necessarily culpable for the clients' actions. The lawyer
may not agree with his/her client and may possess different values, but the role morality of a law-
yer allows him/her to carry out the functions of lawyering without feeling as though he/she has
adopted the same values as the client. See generally LUBAN, supra note 36 (arguing the difference
between role morality and common morality).
81 Cf JEFFERY M. ScHEvITz, THE WEAPONSMAKERS: PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL CRISIS
DURING THE VIETNAM WAR (1979) (arguing that engineers resolve moral conflicts in their work by
focusing on the technical aspects of their job); see also HANNA ARENDT, EICHMANN IN
JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL (1963) (showing that a focus on technical as-
pects of the job can blind participants to moral issues as large as organizing Nazi Germany's sys-
tematic extermination of six million Jews).
82 WILLIAM SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
IN AMERICA 191-218 (1995) (arguing that the civic orientation of professionalism has been
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Most of our respondents strategically use role differentiation and role
morality to resolve their ethical dilemmas. One explained that, "whenever I feel
uncomfortable about a case, I just make sure that everything I do is ethical and
on the up-and-up. 83 As long as their behavior breaks none of the canons of
professional responsibility, respondents are absolved of guilt. One respondent
dislikes representing toxic polluters, but following the principle of zealous ad-
vocacy, he reports that; "I just close my eyes and do it." 84
Communitarians criticize the norm of zealous advocacy for its focus on
individual rights even at the expense of community well-being. Mary Ann
Glendon argues that:
our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expecta-
tions, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might
lead towards consensus, accommodation, or at least the discov-
ery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibili-
ties, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefits of living in
a democratic social welfare state, without expecting the corre-
sponding civic and personal obligations.85
Our respondents echo this concern. In the words of one young African-
American attorney who was experiencing the pressures of an associate seeking
to be promoted to partner:
We represented a client in a plant closing case that was opposed
by the community. That one made me think a lot because I
grew up in [a poor community] which used to have a heavy
manufacturing base and everyone worked in the mills. I
watched the plants close and watched the parents of friends get
laid off and watched the community go down hill from there. I
recognize that was very possible in this case. While I'm repre-
senting the company, I recognize the community's interests
also. Intellectually, though, it's easy to see that the basis for the
community's lawsuit has no merit .... I guess what I ended up
doing was concentrating on the legal issues because that was
really all that I had control over.86
eclipsed by a more technical vision of ethical responsibility).
83 Telephone Interview with (Frank Painter), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Mar. 1993).
84 Telephone Interview with (Richard Flemming), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Mar.
1993).
85 GLENDON, supra note 13, at 14.
86 Telephone Interview with (Ronald Garry), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Apr. 1993).
[Vol. 105
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss2/8
HARD TO BE A HUMAN BEING AND A LA WYER
Although he is conflicted over his participation in plant closings, this young
attorney is reluctant to explore alternative strategies with his client. He is ap-
proaching partnership in the firm and does not wish to jeopardize his career by
giving the wrong message about his commitment to the firm's goals.
As an African-American from a working class background, this respon-
dent felt that his ability to generate clients for the firm is limited. As he ex-
plained, "as an African-American, I don't have the old friends from growing up
[who would seek out corporate legal counsel]. I can't tap into an old boy net-
work." 87 He felt that because he had little contact with "upper-level manage-
ment that make the company decisions"; he had no freedom to refuse to obey
instructions that were legal but ethically troubling.8 a
Another large law firm attorney finds that her personal acceptance of
the ideology of advocacy helps to reduce ethical ambivalence. 89 This long time
champion of tenant's rights found herself assigned to defend developers and
landlords. She explained that:
I wanted to be involved in developing affordable housing. I
really believe in subsidized housing. But as a lawyer, I work
for a firm that represents towns. I'm representing a town that is
trying to do everything it can to stop subsidized housing. You
owe a duty of representation. I went out and looked at the site
and could see why they had a lot of concerns about the project.
However, I think I'd rather be on the other side. 90
The established ethical principles of the legal profession obligated this lawyer to
advocate a position with which she disagreed. Redefining the issue as a fair
fight between two equal parties, rather than the exploitation of an impoverished
community neutralized cognitive dissonance.91
Several respondents reported resolving their moral reservations by
viewing litigation as a self-contained contest and ignoring the social conse-
quences of their actions. Many of these respondents learned to define law as a
game during law school.92 As John Mixon and Gordon Otto charge, law schools
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Telephone Interview with (Sharon Elder), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Mar. 1993).
90 Id.
91 See Richard Wassertrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS
Q. 1 (1975) (examining role morality as a traditional justification for lawyer behavior). On the
general topic of cognitive dissonance, see LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957) (finding that people strive for internal consistency between their personal beliefs and their
behavior; belief systems may be changed to remove the psychological pain that comes from see-
ing oneself as acting immorally).
92 See GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS, supra note 26, at 61-65.
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"implicitly sanction questionable behavior by emphasizing constantly the total
relativity of legal and ethical conduct." 93 One large firm associate explained:
I buy into the game metaphor, it's very important to me. It
helps me define my role. When I construct arguments with my
boss, I never say that I'm not going to make that argument be-
cause it's not fair or because I don't believe in it. The only
question I ask is it good enough to make in terms of its suc-
cess.
94
Another respondent doesn't worry about his personal morality because, "it is
only rich organizations who are fighting over these issues. Everything that I do
is pretty neutral." 95
Ironically, the extreme examples of malfeasance that had been presented
in their professional responsibility classes are occasionally used to minimize the
moral ambiguities in the respondent's current practice. One respondent excused
his ethically questionable actions by saying that, "I wouldn't have worked on
the Pinto case. The cases I work on aren't nearly as bad. 96 Another respondent
justified defending a client who had bilked the government out of an enormous
sum on the grounds that, "at least I'm not hurting people., 97 These examples of
ideological work 98 illustrate Rhode's warning that:
the danger in diluting the ethical content of ethical codes is that
they will nonetheless pass for ethics. New entrants are social-
ized to the lowest common denominator of conduct that a
highly self-interested group will tolerate .... Standards pitched
at a more demanding level can reinforce the lawyer who would
prefer the ethical course but is reluctant to appear sanctimoni-
ous.
99
Several of our respondents reported that they had engaged in question-
able practices out of a desire to be a team player. It is natural that a group of
individuals working long hours together in an attempt to win a case become
93 John Mixon & Gordon Otto, Continuous Quality Improvement, Law, and Legal Education,
43 EMORY L. J. 393, 463 (1994).
94 Telephone Interview with (Frank Painter), supra note 83.
95 Telephone Interview with (Brenda Boswell), supra note 76.
96 Telephone Interview with (Michael Preston), supra note 58.
97 Telephone Interview with (Gerry Schultz), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Mar. 1993).
98 See generally Granfield & Koenig, supra note 79 (discussing ideological work in law
schools).
99 Rhode, Institutionalizing Ethics, supra note 17, at 730.
[Vol. 105
22
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 105, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 8
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol105/iss2/8
HARD TO BE A HUMAN BEING AND A LAWYER
close friends, but in these emotional bonds lie potential moral pitfalls. The
team's activities become by definition moral, or at least justifiable, because of
the low ethical standards attributed to the opposition. Many respondents assured
us that no one with whom they worked closely had suspect ethical principles,
but they believed that other attorneys could not be trusted. The unethical tactics
of opposing lawyers were seen as placing the respondents' team at a tactical
disadvantage that had to be countered by, as one respondent explained, "bending
the rules."' °
Some respondents acknowledged that partisan loyalty to the team had
occasionally blinded them to the moral implications of their own conduct. An
African-American female told us that she had avoided recognizing the social
impact of drafting documents which resulted in foreclosure against large num-
bers of minority homeowners by thinking of her actions as "neutral."'' ° She was
merely "pushing paper," not throwing people out of their homes. 10 2 A strong
sense of teamwork and group loyalty prevented her from seeing the case as any-
thing other than a contest in which her cleverness was valued. Now that she has
left the firm, she marvels that she did not recognize the harm she helped inflict
upon the poor:
I didn't think about the imbalance of power at the firm. It was
mostly one person with money against another person with
money. Even when it started getting involved with bank stuff, I
didn't see an imbalance of power. But now, being on the other
side, I see what that meant. I was assisting banks who didn't
want to comply with community reinvestment laws.'0 3
Emotional loyalty to the litigation team often extends to developing an
enthusiasm for the client's cause. Like Robert Nelson, we found that lawyers
minimize ethical dilemmas by identifying with their clients.1 4 One respondent
reported that she had previously sympathized with injured plaintiffs, but now, as
a medical malpractice defense attorney she realizes that frequently "doctors and
medical products manufacturers are victims of frivolous lawsuits."' 0 5 Similarly,
another lawyer has come to recognize that the large insurance companies he
represents are morally correct because, "I feel that people who have been pollut-
100 Telephone Interview with (Jonathon Morris), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Apr.
1993).
101 Telephone Interview with (Brenda Boswell), supra note 76.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 NELSON, supra note 12, at 231-243.
1o5 Telephone Interview with (Robin Furst), Harvard Law School class of 1987 (Mar. 1993).
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ing are trying to get out of their responsibility for it and want to bring insurance
companies down with them."'
10 6
It was quite common for respondents to identify with clients for whom
they previously had felt antipathy. One large law firm attorney illustrates this
method of resolving ethical ambiguity:
We had a case where a company wanted to develop a hazardous
waste incinerator in a poor area. What we did was perfectly le-
gal. We bought the land from the owners. We told them we
were developing an industrial park, which was semi-true. But,
this case went against my general convictions about environ-
mental issues, particularly putting something like this in a poor
area where people can't or won't resist. But I convinced myself
that there's always another side. By the time I was done, I
thought our client was closer to the right side of things than the
townspeople. The stuff has to go somewhere. I tended to ac-
cept what the client was saying about all the precautions they
would take. 10 7
Strain is reduced by coming to believe that you and your team, and by extension
your client, are in the right. However, the most effective technique is sometimes
to simply ignore ethical implications altogether. In the words of one typical
respondent, "I used to care about how the things I did as a lawyer affected peo-
ple, but I don't find myself asking these questions anymore." 108
Organizational pressures also led respondents to compromise their ethi-
cal standards. Respondents in our sample had experienced moral dilemmas re-
sulting from the concealment of sensitive documents, from deceptions perpetu-
ated by their clients, and from the necessity of representing clients of question-
able character. Most went along with the misbehavior without protest for fear of
damaging their careers. Minority respondents were particularly likely to feel the
need to compromise their ethical principles in order to protect their jobs. One
African-American attorney at a large law firm representing industrial polluters
complained that he possessed little opportunity to convince clients to behave in
a more socially responsible fashion because:
I'm very frightened of getting fired so I never pushed the enve-
lope. I've been here for three years and each year they give me
the lowest evaluation and salary. I don't say much about the
cases or what I think should be done. I also tell other black
106 Telephone Interview with (Ralph Sampson), Harvard Law School class of 1988 (Mar.
1993).
107 Telephone Interview with (Richard Hemming), supra note 84.
108 Telephone Interview with (Robert Smart), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Apr. 1993).
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lawyers not to complain for the same reason I didn't com-
plain.' 
9
Another minority respondent argued that moral compromise was justified be-
cause it permitted him to perform some progressive pro bono work. 1" 0 He ad-
mitted that the dream of championing social reform from the corporate law of-
fices had proved largely illusionary."' Organizational pressures to make partner
discourages spending much time in uncompensated practice. For most respon-
dents, pro bono was no longer connected to societal reform as much as it offered
ways to bring the firm new clients, good publicity or to do favors for current
clients. 2 Respondents were concerned that their careers would be damaged if
they became involved in pro bono cases that disturbed conservative partners or
the firm's establishment clients.
IV. BRINGING CONTEXT INTO LEGAL ETHICS INSTRUCTION
The data presented in this study of young lawyers indicates that most
have internalized the ethical ideology of the legal profession. They define
themselves as highly moral and view their legal practice as socially neutral.
These attorneys attribute lower ethical standards to the opposition. They tend to
believe that ethical dilemmas arise principally in fields like criminal law and
have many ready-made rationales for ignoring the "higher immorality" that is
involved in some elite legal work." 3 For most respondents, the practice of law
has become largely devoid of moral questions, although the tactics employed
and the actions of clients are sometimes personally troubling.
Cases are reduced to their technical merits and ethics to obeying the
professional standards of conduct. Even where issues of power and inequality
clearly enter into cases, the zealous advocacy principle relieves these attorneys
of moral responsibility. Still, these young attorneys wish that their legal educa-
tion had done more to prepare them for the social and moral complexities that
they experience. In general, our findings suggest the need for a more compre-
hensive, contextualized approach to legal ethics education."
4
109 Telephone Interview with (David Dennison), Harvard Law School class of 1989 (Mar.
1993).
110 Telephone Interview with (Ronald Garry), supra note 86.
II Id.
112 Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, Stricture and Structure: The Social and Cultural Context of Pro
Bono Work in Wall Street Firms, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1689, 1693-94 (2002) (describing the ways
that law firms use pro bono work to advance their self-interest).
113 MILLS, supra note 37, at 343-61.
114 David Richards, for instance, argues that "we need to fundamentally rethink the propriety of
the academic division of labor that isolates the serious study of history, political philosophy, eco-
nomics, anthropology, or interpretation into separate departments, and segregates their discourses
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The ethical training these respondents received during law school did
not provide sufficient guidance for the intricate social issues presented by legal
practice. We agree with Croft's call for a legal ethics course that would "impart
three overriding skills: (1) an ability to recognize the ethical considerations gen-
erated in various legal practice scenarios; (2) an ability to analyze such scenarios
within a conceptual framework of ethical, jurisprudential, as well as legal, con-
siderations; and (3) a 'capacity for and willingness to engage in reflective judg-
ment."' 115 Our interviews suggest that the ethical instruction these respondents
received in law school failed to fully accomplish these objectives." 16
Legal ethics, as it is traditionally taught, obscures power relations and
organizational dynamics by its frequent failure to consider the social context of
legal practice. The ethical instruction provided by law schools needs to be
strengthened by focusing on contextual pressures such as growing commercial-
ism. In the words of Judge Edwards,
If law firms continue on their current course, law schools must
work all the harder to create "ethical graduates." Such gradu-
ates will at least attempt to resist the institutional pressures and
practice law that serves the public interest. The J.D. who...
knows nothing of professional responsibility will succumb all
the more readily to the pervasive materialism of the law
firms. 117
Too many courses in legal ethics ignore the humanistic issues that arise
during legal practice by focusing solely on decontexualized rules of professional
responsibility. As Elkins points out:
A fundamental tenet of professionalism is that an individual's
failure to adhere to the highest standards or to adequately take
into account the social and philosophical dimensions of his or
from the study of law in a professional school." David A.J. Richards, Liberal Political Culture
and the Marginalized Voice: Interpretive Responsibility and the American Law School, 45 STAN.
L. REv. 1955, 1978 (1993). Such an integration of material could provide more of a foundation
for the study of contextualized ethics. It should be noted that several law professors, recognizing
the value of these disciplines, have begun to utilize this material in their legal ethics classes. See
id.
Hs Croft, supra note 22, at 1341.
116 See Elkins, Professionalism, Craft and Failure, supra note 17, at 199 (advocating contextu-
alized ethics training to "get beyond the law of lawyering and ethics imagined as ethical legal-
ism").
117 Edwards, supra note 24, at 73.
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her professional work is personal and idiosyncratic to that indi-
vidual.) 8
The limitations of legal ethics courses as traditionally constituted help to explain
why so many of our respondents report that their ethics training was not relevant
to their current legal careers.
Our respondents' law school professional responsibility courses stressed
regulation and occupational malfeasance such as conflicts of interest, impropri-
ety, or courtroom misconduct.119 According to our respondents, broader ques-
tions regarding morality, power, social context, team loyalty, or community
responsibilities were rarely, if ever, explored. Such topics are often considered
to be outside the purview of professional responsibility courses. However, these
are the very issues that were most salient among our respondents. Ironically,
these may not be the interests that law students have while they are in law
school and preparing for the bar. As Robert Gordon has observed, "The minute
that a teacher launches a discussion of theory, policy, ethics, or social context
that is not immediately and closely tied to resolving a case situation, most of the
students tune out and put down their pens.,,1 20 There are numerous obstacles
that law professors face when they attempt to teach ethics from a contextualized
perspective. Large class sizes that limit opportunities for innovative but time
consuming projects, lowered number of course credits that can potentially lead
to student hostility over the ratio of work to credit hours, tenure demands on
full-time faculty who are often not encouraged to teach or write in the area, and
the fact that most law schools offer only a basic course in ethics all serve to un-
dermine innovative strategies for teaching legal ethics in a more contextualized
fashion.
12 1
The young attorneys in this study felt that they would have benefited
from more law school explorations of real world and public interest contexts,
from more comparisons with alternative ethical frameworks, and from hearing
from practicing lawyers about the problems they face. 122 Because of the enor-
mous complexity of ethical issues when embedded in their societal contexts, a
single course will not be able to fill such a broad mandate. Ethical issues need
118 Elkins, Professionalism, Craft and Failure, supra note 17, at 939.
119 See generally Paul R. Tremblay, Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry,
36 U.S.F. L. REV. 659 (2002) (arguing that law school ethics classes too often merely instruct law
students on the formal rules of the legal profession).
120 Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground", 91 MICH. L. REV. 2075,
2108 n.81 (1993).
121 See generally Bruce A. Green, Less is More: Teaching Legal Ethics in Context, 39 .WM &
MARY L. REV. 357 (1998) [hereinafter Green, Teaching Legal Ethics].
122 See Richard Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training, and Placing Public Interest Law Stu-
dents, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2002) (arguing that law schools must do everything possible to
encourage public interest experiences during law school).
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to be integrated into the whole curriculum in a pervasive manner rather than
ghettoized into a single professional responsibility course. 123 A contextual per-
spective to legal ethics as distinguished from a survey course in ethics recog-
nizes that any one legal ethics course needs to concentrate on a limited number
of contexts, rather than across the full spectrum of legal practice. 124 Therefore,
honoring a contextualized perspective to ethics instruction demands that there be




Neophyte lawyers generally come into direct contact with the messy
world of legal practice complete with clients, corporate entities, other miscella-
neous interested communities, families, governmental regulations and regula-
tors, colleagues and partners, opposing counsel, and a host of other assorted
players, without the conceptual tools necessary to design their own moral com-
pass. 26 By presenting cases as abstract, decontextualized encounters with face-
less clients, law school does a poor job of preparing its graduates for the moral
ambiguities that they will encounter. In the words of Austin Sarat, law students
"have learned little about encountering people in situations of stress and
fashioning solutions to their problems in ways that are responsive to the human
as well as legal dimensions of the problems."'' 27 Upon graduation, the typical
law school student has had negligible client contact, having learned law in the
absence of actual human beings. Therefore, for many young lawyers, initial
practice experiences may be bewildering and emotionally overwhelming.
Most of the attorneys we interviewed had absorbed the ethical code of
their workplace - a set of values that allowed them to make the compromises
necessary to be professionally successful while viewing oneself as a moral indi-
vidual. The most obvious failures of law school ethics education are the stu-
dents who are incapable of performing the ideological work necessary to con-
tinue in the profession while maintaining self-respect. 128
123 See Rhode, Pervasive Method, supra note 18, at 40-42.
124 See Green, Teaching Legal Ethics, supra note 121, at 359.
125 Id.
126 See Joshua P. Davis, Teaching Values - The Center for Applied Legal Ethics, 36 U.S.F. L.
REv. 593 (2002) (arguing that law professors attempt to inspire their students to act ethically and
morally).
127 Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal
Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43, 43 (199 1).
128 See Deborah L. Rhode, Law, Lawyers, and the Pursuit of Justice, 70 FoRDHAM L. REV.
1543, 1560 (2002) (suggesting that law schools need to "make more sustained efforts to enlist and
equip students to pursue social justice and to lead professional reform").
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Gloria left the law because of deep moral doubts about her ability to do
good work while maintaining her personal integrity. She felt extremely guilty
about exploiting the trust of a naive female litigant who did not understand that
Gloria owed her loyalty to the opposing side. The code of professional ethics,
of course, required Gloria to use any confidences for the benefit of the corpora-
tion she represented. These are the kinds of real world ethical issues that legal
education should not ignore. As Rhode notes, "Practitioners must begin to per-
ceive ethical dilemmas not as aberrant, episodic events, but rather as the inevita-
ble consequences of bureaucratic pressures, adversarial frameworks, and social
inequalities."
' 129
Law professors around the country are attempting to find new ways to
teach contextualized ethics in order to better prepare students like Gloria for
these real world conflicts. 30 Our findings underscore the importance of this ap-
proach.1 31 The issues that troubled our respondents and the management strate-
gies they used to deal with these issues should be a major focus of law school
instruction in ethics.' 32 While it is unclear whether any course or instruction
could have prevented Gloria's disaffection with the legal profession, examina-
tion of issues such as the one she faced will help expose law students to the real
world conflicts and dilemmas that young lawyers will encounter. 133
Further research into the social context of legal practice as it relates to
ethical decision-making is greatly needed. This study of ethics in practice is
limited by the fact that all the lawyers interviewed had previously attended an
elite law school. A larger, more representative sample of attorneys would pro-
vide additional insight into the moral mazes of legal practice. Such data will
help in the designing of more effective professional responsibility instruction
129 Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 651
(1985).
130 See Philip C. Kissam, The Ideology of the Case Method/Final Examination Law School, 70
U. CIN. L. REV. 137, 187-88 (2001) (calling on "reflective" law schools that would provide schol-
arship aimed at engaging professors, students, lawyers, lawmakers and other audiences in reflec-
tive, critical and ethical thought about the kinds of law that would best promote the life chances of
individuals).
131 Cf Louise G. Trubek, Embedded Practices: Lawyers, Clients, and Social Change, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415 (1996) (suggesting that expanded clinical programs in law school
are necessary to provide contextualized learning opportunities).
132 Understanding ethics from the perspective of one's job would be consistent with this point.
See Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics Theory, 31 SErON HALL L.
REV. 829 (2001) (arguing that legal ethics courses should examine the extent to which career
choices offer many attorneys their primary source of discretion and how that reality affects ethics
theory).
133 See Rhode, Professionalism, supra note 25, at 195 (responding to the charge that "students
either have it or they don't, and postgraduate training is an empty proposition."); see also
Dolovich, supra note 23 (arguing that calls for moral renewal issued by the bar will not bring
about the ethical change that appears to be sorely lacking in the American legal profession).
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and will, perhaps, contribute to a process of re-professionalization in the wake
of the current wave of corporate financial scandals.' 34
134 The Securities and Exchange Commission has recently proposed new rules that would force
corporate lawyers to blow the whistle on breaches of securities law they may find while on the
job. These new rules have been put out for public comment and a decision is expected by January
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